A central assumption of many 19th-century political philosophies was that liberation from oppressive social conditions would naturally lead individuals toward higher levels of rationality and moral awareness. Experience has shown that this assumption is overly optimistic. Human beings do not automatically develop greater psychological or moral maturity simply because external constraints are removed. Social behavior is strongly shaped by conditioning, habit and cultural context.

In the U.S., after World War II, these dynamics became particularly visible. American identity increasingly revolved around consumer participation in a rapidly expanding economy. Mass advertising and public relations transformed the cultural landscape, turning the human unconscious itself into a contested economic terrain. Meanwhile, many traditional sources of communal meaning — local civic institutions, religious life and shared cultural practices — gradually weakened.

The paradox was striking. Even as the U.S. experienced one of the most prosperous periods in human history, social alienation intensified. This phenomenon had already been anticipated by 19th-century critics such as Friedrich Nietzsche, who warned that modern societies would experience a crisis of meaning even amid material abundance.

These historical lessons raise an important question for China as it continues its own modernization process. Unlike many Western societies, contemporary Chinese policy discourse places increasing emphasis on the integration of tradition with modernity. This theme has appeared repeatedly in official statements and speeches.

A humanoid robot conducts box-carrying training at a data collection pre-training center for humanoid robots in Hefei, east China's Anhui Province, Dec. 4, 2025. [Photo by Zhang Duan/Xinhua]

This orientation suggests a broader philosophical possibility — one that I would describe as a teleological state. The concept derives from Aristotle's notion of telos, or ultimate purpose. In classical philosophy, political communities were understood not merely as administrative mechanisms but as structures oriented toward a shared conception of the good life. The state existed, in Aristotle's formulation, "not only for the sake of living, but for living well."

Modern political systems have largely abandoned this teleological perspective. Liberal democracies tend to define the state primarily in procedural terms — protecting individual rights, ensuring the rule of law and facilitating economic exchange. While these functions are essential, they do not necessarily provide a coherent account of collective purpose.

A teleological state, by contrast, explicitly articulates a long-term civilizational objective. Such a system does not simply administer economic activity; it frames development within a broader narrative about human flourishing and civilizational direction.

As I see it, China's governance model already contains elements of this orientation. The country's political framework is structured around clearly defined developmental goals — most prominently the long-term objective of building a modern socialist country. Five-year plans function not only as economic management tools but also as instruments for aligning institutional action with these broader objectives.

Specifically, both the 2026 government work report delivered by Premier Li Qiang and the draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) have prioritized cultural-ethical progress, development of cultural undertakings, and enhancement of cultural confidence among the Chinese people. They form a comprehensive framework for achieving such goals as a marked rise in socialist civility, stronger cultural confidence, and a rich cultural life for the population.

China's experience therefore raises a question that extends beyond its own borders: can modern states rediscover a sense of collective purpose without sacrificing pluralism, innovation or individual dignity? As China succeeds in integrating rapid modernization with a clear civilizational telos, it may contribute not only to global economic development but also to a broader rethinking of political philosophy in the 21st century.

Bradley Blankenship is an investigative journalist, columnist, author, political analyst and the founding chairman of the Northern Kentucky Truth & Accountability Project, a local U.S. anti-corruption network and civic oversight body.

The implications of these priorities extend well beyond China's borders. China's economic strategy is unfolding at a time when the international system is undergoing significant turbulence, marked by geopolitical rivalry, supply chain restructuring and growing skepticism toward globalization in parts of the West. Against this backdrop, Beijing has sought to position itself as a stabilizing force in the global economy.

Recent diplomatic engagements illustrate this strategy clearly. In meetings with Western leaders — including French President Emmanuel Macron, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz — Chinese leaders have emphasized China's role as a predictable partner in an increasingly uncertain world. At the same time, China has deepened engagement with developing economies, particularly in the Global South. Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently highlighted policies designed to expand economic cooperation with African countries, including zero-tariff treatment for imports from 53 African nations.

Taken together, these initiatives reflect a broader strategic orientation: China seeks to present itself as a platform for stability and development during what many analysts describe as a transitional phase in the international order.

But beyond the immediate economic and diplomatic dimensions of this strategy lies a deeper and less frequently discussed question — one that is sociological and philosophical in nature. How should a rapidly modernizing society maintain coherence and meaning as it transitions into a highly advanced technological and economic system?

In this respect, China's current stage of development invites comparison with the rise of the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The comparison is not exact. China's institutional structure, cultural context and geopolitical environment differ fundamentally from those of the U.S. a century ago. Nevertheless, from a sociological and psychological perspective, there are instructive parallels.

Aerial photo taken on Sept. 18, 2019 shows a night view of the Lujiazui area in Shanghai, east China. [Photo by Ren Long/Xinhua]

During the 19th century, the American intellectual tradition was strongly influenced by classical philosophy. Thinkers in the United States drew extensively on the Greco-Roman canon — Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Plutarch — emphasizing virtue, civic responsibility and the moral foundations of republican life. This classical orientation was evident in the writings of early American intellectuals and in the broader culture of civic republicanism that shaped the country's political institutions.

However, as the U.S. industrialized and urbanized, this intellectual orientation gradually shifted. By the late 19th century, American thought increasingly turned toward pragmatism, most prominently associated with Charles Sanders Peirce and William James. Pragmatism emphasized practical outcomes and empirical problem-solving rather than metaphysical or moral foundations.

This philosophical shift occurred in parallel with an unprecedented wave of technological and institutional innovation. The U.S. developed modern policing systems, emergency services, national railway networks and urban infrastructure on a massive scale. Electricity, telecommunication and modern sanitation transformed daily life. Industrial production was revolutionized through the introduction of assembly lines and large-scale manufacturing, while mass education expanded rapidly.

The result was the emergence of what might be called a managerial society — a system in which social life increasingly became organized through bureaucratic and technocratic structures. Human beings were progressively treated less as participants in a shared civic order and more as units within systems of administration, production and consumption.

This transformation did not go unnoticed. Karl Marx famously analyzed the phenomenon as a form of alienation inherent in industrial capitalism. Later, the social psychologist Erich Fromm offered a more detailed cultural critique in works such as "The Sane Society." Fromm argued that many modern social systems operate on anthropological assumptions that misunderstand the deeper needs of human beings.

A central assumption of many 19th-century political philosophies was that liberation from oppressive social conditions would naturally lead individuals toward higher levels of rationality and moral awareness. Experience has shown that this assumption is overly optimistic. Human beings do not automatically develop greater psychological or moral maturity simply because external constraints are removed. Social behavior is strongly shaped by conditioning, habit and cultural context.

In the U.S., after World War II, these dynamics became particularly visible. American identity increasingly revolved around consumer participation in a rapidly expanding economy. Mass advertising and public relations transformed the cultural landscape, turning the human unconscious itself into a contested economic terrain. Meanwhile, many traditional sources of communal meaning — local civic institutions, religious life and shared cultural practices — gradually weakened.

The paradox was striking. Even as the U.S. experienced one of the most prosperous periods in human history, social alienation intensified. This phenomenon had already been anticipated by 19th-century critics such as Friedrich Nietzsche, who warned that modern societies would experience a crisis of meaning even amid material abundance.

These historical lessons raise an important question for China as it continues its own modernization process. Unlike many Western societies, contemporary Chinese policy discourse places increasing emphasis on the integration of tradition with modernity. This theme has appeared repeatedly in official statements and speeches.

A humanoid robot conducts box-carrying training at a data collection pre-training center for humanoid robots in Hefei, east China's Anhui Province, Dec. 4, 2025. [Photo by Zhang Duan/Xinhua]

This orientation suggests a broader philosophical possibility — one that I would describe as a teleological state. The concept derives from Aristotle's notion of telos, or ultimate purpose. In classical philosophy, political communities were understood not merely as administrative mechanisms but as structures oriented toward a shared conception of the good life. The state existed, in Aristotle's formulation, "not only for the sake of living, but for living well."

Modern political systems have largely abandoned this teleological perspective. Liberal democracies tend to define the state primarily in procedural terms — protecting individual rights, ensuring the rule of law and facilitating economic exchange. While these functions are essential, they do not necessarily provide a coherent account of collective purpose.

A teleological state, by contrast, explicitly articulates a long-term civilizational objective. Such a system does not simply administer economic activity; it frames development within a broader narrative about human flourishing and civilizational direction.

As I see it, China's governance model already contains elements of this orientation. The country's political framework is structured around clearly defined developmental goals — most prominently the long-term objective of building a modern socialist country. Five-year plans function not only as economic management tools but also as instruments for aligning institutional action with these broader objectives.

Specifically, both the 2026 government work report delivered by Premier Li Qiang and the draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) have prioritized cultural-ethical progress, development of cultural undertakings, and enhancement of cultural confidence among the Chinese people. They form a comprehensive framework for achieving such goals as a marked rise in socialist civility, stronger cultural confidence, and a rich cultural life for the population.

China's experience therefore raises a question that extends beyond its own borders: can modern states rediscover a sense of collective purpose without sacrificing pluralism, innovation or individual dignity? As China succeeds in integrating rapid modernization with a clear civilizational telos, it may contribute not only to global economic development but also to a broader rethinking of political philosophy in the 21st century.

Bradley Blankenship is an investigative journalist, columnist, author, political analyst and the founding chairman of the Northern Kentucky Truth & Accountability Project, a local U.S. anti-corruption network and civic oversight body.

A central assumption of many 19th-century political philosophies was that liberation from oppressive social conditions would naturally lead individuals toward higher levels of rationality and moral awareness. Experience has shown that this assumption is overly optimistic. Human beings do not automatically develop greater psychological or moral maturity simply because external constraints are removed. Social behavior is strongly shaped by conditioning, habit and cultural context.

In the U.S., after World War II, these dynamics became particularly visible. American identity increasingly revolved around consumer participation in a rapidly expanding economy. Mass advertising and public relations transformed the cultural landscape, turning the human unconscious itself into a contested economic terrain. Meanwhile, many traditional sources of communal meaning — local civic institutions, religious life and shared cultural practices — gradually weakened.

The paradox was striking. Even as the U.S. experienced one of the most prosperous periods in human history, social alienation intensified. This phenomenon had already been anticipated by 19th-century critics such as Friedrich Nietzsche, who warned that modern societies would experience a crisis of meaning even amid material abundance.

These historical lessons raise an important question for China as it continues its own modernization process. Unlike many Western societies, contemporary Chinese policy discourse places increasing emphasis on the integration of tradition with modernity. This theme has appeared repeatedly in official statements and speeches.

A humanoid robot conducts box-carrying training at a data collection pre-training center for humanoid robots in Hefei, east China's Anhui Province, Dec. 4, 2025. [Photo by Zhang Duan/Xinhua]

This orientation suggests a broader philosophical possibility — one that I would describe as a teleological state. The concept derives from Aristotle's notion of telos, or ultimate purpose. In classical philosophy, political communities were understood not merely as administrative mechanisms but as structures oriented toward a shared conception of the good life. The state existed, in Aristotle's formulation, "not only for the sake of living, but for living well."

Modern political systems have largely abandoned this teleological perspective. Liberal democracies tend to define the state primarily in procedural terms — protecting individual rights, ensuring the rule of law and facilitating economic exchange. While these functions are essential, they do not necessarily provide a coherent account of collective purpose.

A teleological state, by contrast, explicitly articulates a long-term civilizational objective. Such a system does not simply administer economic activity; it frames development within a broader narrative about human flourishing and civilizational direction.

As I see it, China's governance model already contains elements of this orientation. The country's political framework is structured around clearly defined developmental goals — most prominently the long-term objective of building a modern socialist country. Five-year plans function not only as economic management tools but also as instruments for aligning institutional action with these broader objectives.

Specifically, both the 2026 government work report delivered by Premier Li Qiang and the draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) have prioritized cultural-ethical progress, development of cultural undertakings, and enhancement of cultural confidence among the Chinese people. They form a comprehensive framework for achieving such goals as a marked rise in socialist civility, stronger cultural confidence, and a rich cultural life for the population.

China's experience therefore raises a question that extends beyond its own borders: can modern states rediscover a sense of collective purpose without sacrificing pluralism, innovation or individual dignity? As China succeeds in integrating rapid modernization with a clear civilizational telos, it may contribute not only to global economic development but also to a broader rethinking of political philosophy in the 21st century.

Bradley Blankenship is an investigative journalist, columnist, author, political analyst and the founding chairman of the Northern Kentucky Truth & Accountability Project, a local U.S. anti-corruption network and civic oversight body.

The implications of these priorities extend well beyond China's borders. China's economic strategy is unfolding at a time when the international system is undergoing significant turbulence, marked by geopolitical rivalry, supply chain restructuring and growing skepticism toward globalization in parts of the West. Against this backdrop, Beijing has sought to position itself as a stabilizing force in the global economy.

Recent diplomatic engagements illustrate this strategy clearly. In meetings with Western leaders — including French President Emmanuel Macron, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz — Chinese leaders have emphasized China's role as a predictable partner in an increasingly uncertain world. At the same time, China has deepened engagement with developing economies, particularly in the Global South. Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently highlighted policies designed to expand economic cooperation with African countries, including zero-tariff treatment for imports from 53 African nations.

Taken together, these initiatives reflect a broader strategic orientation: China seeks to present itself as a platform for stability and development during what many analysts describe as a transitional phase in the international order.

But beyond the immediate economic and diplomatic dimensions of this strategy lies a deeper and less frequently discussed question — one that is sociological and philosophical in nature. How should a rapidly modernizing society maintain coherence and meaning as it transitions into a highly advanced technological and economic system?

In this respect, China's current stage of development invites comparison with the rise of the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The comparison is not exact. China's institutional structure, cultural context and geopolitical environment differ fundamentally from those of the U.S. a century ago. Nevertheless, from a sociological and psychological perspective, there are instructive parallels.

Aerial photo taken on Sept. 18, 2019 shows a night view of the Lujiazui area in Shanghai, east China. [Photo by Ren Long/Xinhua]

During the 19th century, the American intellectual tradition was strongly influenced by classical philosophy. Thinkers in the United States drew extensively on the Greco-Roman canon — Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Plutarch — emphasizing virtue, civic responsibility and the moral foundations of republican life. This classical orientation was evident in the writings of early American intellectuals and in the broader culture of civic republicanism that shaped the country's political institutions.

However, as the U.S. industrialized and urbanized, this intellectual orientation gradually shifted. By the late 19th century, American thought increasingly turned toward pragmatism, most prominently associated with Charles Sanders Peirce and William James. Pragmatism emphasized practical outcomes and empirical problem-solving rather than metaphysical or moral foundations.

This philosophical shift occurred in parallel with an unprecedented wave of technological and institutional innovation. The U.S. developed modern policing systems, emergency services, national railway networks and urban infrastructure on a massive scale. Electricity, telecommunication and modern sanitation transformed daily life. Industrial production was revolutionized through the introduction of assembly lines and large-scale manufacturing, while mass education expanded rapidly.

The result was the emergence of what might be called a managerial society — a system in which social life increasingly became organized through bureaucratic and technocratic structures. Human beings were progressively treated less as participants in a shared civic order and more as units within systems of administration, production and consumption.

This transformation did not go unnoticed. Karl Marx famously analyzed the phenomenon as a form of alienation inherent in industrial capitalism. Later, the social psychologist Erich Fromm offered a more detailed cultural critique in works such as "The Sane Society." Fromm argued that many modern social systems operate on anthropological assumptions that misunderstand the deeper needs of human beings.

A central assumption of many 19th-century political philosophies was that liberation from oppressive social conditions would naturally lead individuals toward higher levels of rationality and moral awareness. Experience has shown that this assumption is overly optimistic. Human beings do not automatically develop greater psychological or moral maturity simply because external constraints are removed. Social behavior is strongly shaped by conditioning, habit and cultural context.

In the U.S., after World War II, these dynamics became particularly visible. American identity increasingly revolved around consumer participation in a rapidly expanding economy. Mass advertising and public relations transformed the cultural landscape, turning the human unconscious itself into a contested economic terrain. Meanwhile, many traditional sources of communal meaning — local civic institutions, religious life and shared cultural practices — gradually weakened.

The paradox was striking. Even as the U.S. experienced one of the most prosperous periods in human history, social alienation intensified. This phenomenon had already been anticipated by 19th-century critics such as Friedrich Nietzsche, who warned that modern societies would experience a crisis of meaning even amid material abundance.

These historical lessons raise an important question for China as it continues its own modernization process. Unlike many Western societies, contemporary Chinese policy discourse places increasing emphasis on the integration of tradition with modernity. This theme has appeared repeatedly in official statements and speeches.

A humanoid robot conducts box-carrying training at a data collection pre-training center for humanoid robots in Hefei, east China's Anhui Province, Dec. 4, 2025. [Photo by Zhang Duan/Xinhua]

This orientation suggests a broader philosophical possibility — one that I would describe as a teleological state. The concept derives from Aristotle's notion of telos, or ultimate purpose. In classical philosophy, political communities were understood not merely as administrative mechanisms but as structures oriented toward a shared conception of the good life. The state existed, in Aristotle's formulation, "not only for the sake of living, but for living well."

Modern political systems have largely abandoned this teleological perspective. Liberal democracies tend to define the state primarily in procedural terms — protecting individual rights, ensuring the rule of law and facilitating economic exchange. While these functions are essential, they do not necessarily provide a coherent account of collective purpose.

A teleological state, by contrast, explicitly articulates a long-term civilizational objective. Such a system does not simply administer economic activity; it frames development within a broader narrative about human flourishing and civilizational direction.

As I see it, China's governance model already contains elements of this orientation. The country's political framework is structured around clearly defined developmental goals — most prominently the long-term objective of building a modern socialist country. Five-year plans function not only as economic management tools but also as instruments for aligning institutional action with these broader objectives.

Specifically, both the 2026 government work report delivered by Premier Li Qiang and the draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) have prioritized cultural-ethical progress, development of cultural undertakings, and enhancement of cultural confidence among the Chinese people. They form a comprehensive framework for achieving such goals as a marked rise in socialist civility, stronger cultural confidence, and a rich cultural life for the population.

China's experience therefore raises a question that extends beyond its own borders: can modern states rediscover a sense of collective purpose without sacrificing pluralism, innovation or individual dignity? As China succeeds in integrating rapid modernization with a clear civilizational telos, it may contribute not only to global economic development but also to a broader rethinking of political philosophy in the 21st century.

Bradley Blankenship is an investigative journalist, columnist, author, political analyst and the founding chairman of the Northern Kentucky Truth & Accountability Project, a local U.S. anti-corruption network and civic oversight body.

A central assumption of many 19th-century political philosophies was that liberation from oppressive social conditions would naturally lead individuals toward higher levels of rationality and moral awareness. Experience has shown that this assumption is overly optimistic. Human beings do not automatically develop greater psychological or moral maturity simply because external constraints are removed. Social behavior is strongly shaped by conditioning, habit and cultural context.

In the U.S., after World War II, these dynamics became particularly visible. American identity increasingly revolved around consumer participation in a rapidly expanding economy. Mass advertising and public relations transformed the cultural landscape, turning the human unconscious itself into a contested economic terrain. Meanwhile, many traditional sources of communal meaning — local civic institutions, religious life and shared cultural practices — gradually weakened.

The paradox was striking. Even as the U.S. experienced one of the most prosperous periods in human history, social alienation intensified. This phenomenon had already been anticipated by 19th-century critics such as Friedrich Nietzsche, who warned that modern societies would experience a crisis of meaning even amid material abundance.

These historical lessons raise an important question for China as it continues its own modernization process. Unlike many Western societies, contemporary Chinese policy discourse places increasing emphasis on the integration of tradition with modernity. This theme has appeared repeatedly in official statements and speeches.

A humanoid robot conducts box-carrying training at a data collection pre-training center for humanoid robots in Hefei, east China's Anhui Province, Dec. 4, 2025. [Photo by Zhang Duan/Xinhua]

This orientation suggests a broader philosophical possibility — one that I would describe as a teleological state. The concept derives from Aristotle's notion of telos, or ultimate purpose. In classical philosophy, political communities were understood not merely as administrative mechanisms but as structures oriented toward a shared conception of the good life. The state existed, in Aristotle's formulation, "not only for the sake of living, but for living well."

Modern political systems have largely abandoned this teleological perspective. Liberal democracies tend to define the state primarily in procedural terms — protecting individual rights, ensuring the rule of law and facilitating economic exchange. While these functions are essential, they do not necessarily provide a coherent account of collective purpose.

A teleological state, by contrast, explicitly articulates a long-term civilizational objective. Such a system does not simply administer economic activity; it frames development within a broader narrative about human flourishing and civilizational direction.

As I see it, China's governance model already contains elements of this orientation. The country's political framework is structured around clearly defined developmental goals — most prominently the long-term objective of building a modern socialist country. Five-year plans function not only as economic management tools but also as instruments for aligning institutional action with these broader objectives.

Specifically, both the 2026 government work report delivered by Premier Li Qiang and the draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) have prioritized cultural-ethical progress, development of cultural undertakings, and enhancement of cultural confidence among the Chinese people. They form a comprehensive framework for achieving such goals as a marked rise in socialist civility, stronger cultural confidence, and a rich cultural life for the population.

China's experience therefore raises a question that extends beyond its own borders: can modern states rediscover a sense of collective purpose without sacrificing pluralism, innovation or individual dignity? As China succeeds in integrating rapid modernization with a clear civilizational telos, it may contribute not only to global economic development but also to a broader rethinking of political philosophy in the 21st century.

Bradley Blankenship is an investigative journalist, columnist, author, political analyst and the founding chairman of the Northern Kentucky Truth & Accountability Project, a local U.S. anti-corruption network and civic oversight body.

The implications of these priorities extend well beyond China's borders. China's economic strategy is unfolding at a time when the international system is undergoing significant turbulence, marked by geopolitical rivalry, supply chain restructuring and growing skepticism toward globalization in parts of the West. Against this backdrop, Beijing has sought to position itself as a stabilizing force in the global economy.

Recent diplomatic engagements illustrate this strategy clearly. In meetings with Western leaders — including French President Emmanuel Macron, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz — Chinese leaders have emphasized China's role as a predictable partner in an increasingly uncertain world. At the same time, China has deepened engagement with developing economies, particularly in the Global South. Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently highlighted policies designed to expand economic cooperation with African countries, including zero-tariff treatment for imports from 53 African nations.

Taken together, these initiatives reflect a broader strategic orientation: China seeks to present itself as a platform for stability and development during what many analysts describe as a transitional phase in the international order.

But beyond the immediate economic and diplomatic dimensions of this strategy lies a deeper and less frequently discussed question — one that is sociological and philosophical in nature. How should a rapidly modernizing society maintain coherence and meaning as it transitions into a highly advanced technological and economic system?

In this respect, China's current stage of development invites comparison with the rise of the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The comparison is not exact. China's institutional structure, cultural context and geopolitical environment differ fundamentally from those of the U.S. a century ago. Nevertheless, from a sociological and psychological perspective, there are instructive parallels.

Aerial photo taken on Sept. 18, 2019 shows a night view of the Lujiazui area in Shanghai, east China. [Photo by Ren Long/Xinhua]

During the 19th century, the American intellectual tradition was strongly influenced by classical philosophy. Thinkers in the United States drew extensively on the Greco-Roman canon — Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Plutarch — emphasizing virtue, civic responsibility and the moral foundations of republican life. This classical orientation was evident in the writings of early American intellectuals and in the broader culture of civic republicanism that shaped the country's political institutions.

However, as the U.S. industrialized and urbanized, this intellectual orientation gradually shifted. By the late 19th century, American thought increasingly turned toward pragmatism, most prominently associated with Charles Sanders Peirce and William James. Pragmatism emphasized practical outcomes and empirical problem-solving rather than metaphysical or moral foundations.

This philosophical shift occurred in parallel with an unprecedented wave of technological and institutional innovation. The U.S. developed modern policing systems, emergency services, national railway networks and urban infrastructure on a massive scale. Electricity, telecommunication and modern sanitation transformed daily life. Industrial production was revolutionized through the introduction of assembly lines and large-scale manufacturing, while mass education expanded rapidly.

The result was the emergence of what might be called a managerial society — a system in which social life increasingly became organized through bureaucratic and technocratic structures. Human beings were progressively treated less as participants in a shared civic order and more as units within systems of administration, production and consumption.

This transformation did not go unnoticed. Karl Marx famously analyzed the phenomenon as a form of alienation inherent in industrial capitalism. Later, the social psychologist Erich Fromm offered a more detailed cultural critique in works such as "The Sane Society." Fromm argued that many modern social systems operate on anthropological assumptions that misunderstand the deeper needs of human beings.

A central assumption of many 19th-century political philosophies was that liberation from oppressive social conditions would naturally lead individuals toward higher levels of rationality and moral awareness. Experience has shown that this assumption is overly optimistic. Human beings do not automatically develop greater psychological or moral maturity simply because external constraints are removed. Social behavior is strongly shaped by conditioning, habit and cultural context.

In the U.S., after World War II, these dynamics became particularly visible. American identity increasingly revolved around consumer participation in a rapidly expanding economy. Mass advertising and public relations transformed the cultural landscape, turning the human unconscious itself into a contested economic terrain. Meanwhile, many traditional sources of communal meaning — local civic institutions, religious life and shared cultural practices — gradually weakened.

The paradox was striking. Even as the U.S. experienced one of the most prosperous periods in human history, social alienation intensified. This phenomenon had already been anticipated by 19th-century critics such as Friedrich Nietzsche, who warned that modern societies would experience a crisis of meaning even amid material abundance.

These historical lessons raise an important question for China as it continues its own modernization process. Unlike many Western societies, contemporary Chinese policy discourse places increasing emphasis on the integration of tradition with modernity. This theme has appeared repeatedly in official statements and speeches.

A humanoid robot conducts box-carrying training at a data collection pre-training center for humanoid robots in Hefei, east China's Anhui Province, Dec. 4, 2025. [Photo by Zhang Duan/Xinhua]

This orientation suggests a broader philosophical possibility — one that I would describe as a teleological state. The concept derives from Aristotle's notion of telos, or ultimate purpose. In classical philosophy, political communities were understood not merely as administrative mechanisms but as structures oriented toward a shared conception of the good life. The state existed, in Aristotle's formulation, "not only for the sake of living, but for living well."

Modern political systems have largely abandoned this teleological perspective. Liberal democracies tend to define the state primarily in procedural terms — protecting individual rights, ensuring the rule of law and facilitating economic exchange. While these functions are essential, they do not necessarily provide a coherent account of collective purpose.

A teleological state, by contrast, explicitly articulates a long-term civilizational objective. Such a system does not simply administer economic activity; it frames development within a broader narrative about human flourishing and civilizational direction.

As I see it, China's governance model already contains elements of this orientation. The country's political framework is structured around clearly defined developmental goals — most prominently the long-term objective of building a modern socialist country. Five-year plans function not only as economic management tools but also as instruments for aligning institutional action with these broader objectives.

Specifically, both the 2026 government work report delivered by Premier Li Qiang and the draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) have prioritized cultural-ethical progress, development of cultural undertakings, and enhancement of cultural confidence among the Chinese people. They form a comprehensive framework for achieving such goals as a marked rise in socialist civility, stronger cultural confidence, and a rich cultural life for the population.

China's experience therefore raises a question that extends beyond its own borders: can modern states rediscover a sense of collective purpose without sacrificing pluralism, innovation or individual dignity? As China succeeds in integrating rapid modernization with a clear civilizational telos, it may contribute not only to global economic development but also to a broader rethinking of political philosophy in the 21st century.

Bradley Blankenship is an investigative journalist, columnist, author, political analyst and the founding chairman of the Northern Kentucky Truth & Accountability Project, a local U.S. anti-corruption network and civic oversight body.

A central assumption of many 19th-century political philosophies was that liberation from oppressive social conditions would naturally lead individuals toward higher levels of rationality and moral awareness. Experience has shown that this assumption is overly optimistic. Human beings do not automatically develop greater psychological or moral maturity simply because external constraints are removed. Social behavior is strongly shaped by conditioning, habit and cultural context.

In the U.S., after World War II, these dynamics became particularly visible. American identity increasingly revolved around consumer participation in a rapidly expanding economy. Mass advertising and public relations transformed the cultural landscape, turning the human unconscious itself into a contested economic terrain. Meanwhile, many traditional sources of communal meaning — local civic institutions, religious life and shared cultural practices — gradually weakened.

The paradox was striking. Even as the U.S. experienced one of the most prosperous periods in human history, social alienation intensified. This phenomenon had already been anticipated by 19th-century critics such as Friedrich Nietzsche, who warned that modern societies would experience a crisis of meaning even amid material abundance.

These historical lessons raise an important question for China as it continues its own modernization process. Unlike many Western societies, contemporary Chinese policy discourse places increasing emphasis on the integration of tradition with modernity. This theme has appeared repeatedly in official statements and speeches.

A humanoid robot conducts box-carrying training at a data collection pre-training center for humanoid robots in Hefei, east China's Anhui Province, Dec. 4, 2025. [Photo by Zhang Duan/Xinhua]

This orientation suggests a broader philosophical possibility — one that I would describe as a teleological state. The concept derives from Aristotle's notion of telos, or ultimate purpose. In classical philosophy, political communities were understood not merely as administrative mechanisms but as structures oriented toward a shared conception of the good life. The state existed, in Aristotle's formulation, "not only for the sake of living, but for living well."

Modern political systems have largely abandoned this teleological perspective. Liberal democracies tend to define the state primarily in procedural terms — protecting individual rights, ensuring the rule of law and facilitating economic exchange. While these functions are essential, they do not necessarily provide a coherent account of collective purpose.

A teleological state, by contrast, explicitly articulates a long-term civilizational objective. Such a system does not simply administer economic activity; it frames development within a broader narrative about human flourishing and civilizational direction.

As I see it, China's governance model already contains elements of this orientation. The country's political framework is structured around clearly defined developmental goals — most prominently the long-term objective of building a modern socialist country. Five-year plans function not only as economic management tools but also as instruments for aligning institutional action with these broader objectives.

Specifically, both the 2026 government work report delivered by Premier Li Qiang and the draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) have prioritized cultural-ethical progress, development of cultural undertakings, and enhancement of cultural confidence among the Chinese people. They form a comprehensive framework for achieving such goals as a marked rise in socialist civility, stronger cultural confidence, and a rich cultural life for the population.

China's experience therefore raises a question that extends beyond its own borders: can modern states rediscover a sense of collective purpose without sacrificing pluralism, innovation or individual dignity? As China succeeds in integrating rapid modernization with a clear civilizational telos, it may contribute not only to global economic development but also to a broader rethinking of political philosophy in the 21st century.

Bradley Blankenship is an investigative journalist, columnist, author, political analyst and the founding chairman of the Northern Kentucky Truth & Accountability Project, a local U.S. anti-corruption network and civic oversight body.

The implications of these priorities extend well beyond China's borders. China's economic strategy is unfolding at a time when the international system is undergoing significant turbulence, marked by geopolitical rivalry, supply chain restructuring and growing skepticism toward globalization in parts of the West. Against this backdrop, Beijing has sought to position itself as a stabilizing force in the global economy.

Recent diplomatic engagements illustrate this strategy clearly. In meetings with Western leaders — including French President Emmanuel Macron, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz — Chinese leaders have emphasized China's role as a predictable partner in an increasingly uncertain world. At the same time, China has deepened engagement with developing economies, particularly in the Global South. Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently highlighted policies designed to expand economic cooperation with African countries, including zero-tariff treatment for imports from 53 African nations.

Taken together, these initiatives reflect a broader strategic orientation: China seeks to present itself as a platform for stability and development during what many analysts describe as a transitional phase in the international order.

But beyond the immediate economic and diplomatic dimensions of this strategy lies a deeper and less frequently discussed question — one that is sociological and philosophical in nature. How should a rapidly modernizing society maintain coherence and meaning as it transitions into a highly advanced technological and economic system?

In this respect, China's current stage of development invites comparison with the rise of the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The comparison is not exact. China's institutional structure, cultural context and geopolitical environment differ fundamentally from those of the U.S. a century ago. Nevertheless, from a sociological and psychological perspective, there are instructive parallels.

Aerial photo taken on Sept. 18, 2019 shows a night view of the Lujiazui area in Shanghai, east China. [Photo by Ren Long/Xinhua]

During the 19th century, the American intellectual tradition was strongly influenced by classical philosophy. Thinkers in the United States drew extensively on the Greco-Roman canon — Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Plutarch — emphasizing virtue, civic responsibility and the moral foundations of republican life. This classical orientation was evident in the writings of early American intellectuals and in the broader culture of civic republicanism that shaped the country's political institutions.

However, as the U.S. industrialized and urbanized, this intellectual orientation gradually shifted. By the late 19th century, American thought increasingly turned toward pragmatism, most prominently associated with Charles Sanders Peirce and William James. Pragmatism emphasized practical outcomes and empirical problem-solving rather than metaphysical or moral foundations.

This philosophical shift occurred in parallel with an unprecedented wave of technological and institutional innovation. The U.S. developed modern policing systems, emergency services, national railway networks and urban infrastructure on a massive scale. Electricity, telecommunication and modern sanitation transformed daily life. Industrial production was revolutionized through the introduction of assembly lines and large-scale manufacturing, while mass education expanded rapidly.

The result was the emergence of what might be called a managerial society — a system in which social life increasingly became organized through bureaucratic and technocratic structures. Human beings were progressively treated less as participants in a shared civic order and more as units within systems of administration, production and consumption.

This transformation did not go unnoticed. Karl Marx famously analyzed the phenomenon as a form of alienation inherent in industrial capitalism. Later, the social psychologist Erich Fromm offered a more detailed cultural critique in works such as "The Sane Society." Fromm argued that many modern social systems operate on anthropological assumptions that misunderstand the deeper needs of human beings.

A central assumption of many 19th-century political philosophies was that liberation from oppressive social conditions would naturally lead individuals toward higher levels of rationality and moral awareness. Experience has shown that this assumption is overly optimistic. Human beings do not automatically develop greater psychological or moral maturity simply because external constraints are removed. Social behavior is strongly shaped by conditioning, habit and cultural context.

In the U.S., after World War II, these dynamics became particularly visible. American identity increasingly revolved around consumer participation in a rapidly expanding economy. Mass advertising and public relations transformed the cultural landscape, turning the human unconscious itself into a contested economic terrain. Meanwhile, many traditional sources of communal meaning — local civic institutions, religious life and shared cultural practices — gradually weakened.

The paradox was striking. Even as the U.S. experienced one of the most prosperous periods in human history, social alienation intensified. This phenomenon had already been anticipated by 19th-century critics such as Friedrich Nietzsche, who warned that modern societies would experience a crisis of meaning even amid material abundance.

These historical lessons raise an important question for China as it continues its own modernization process. Unlike many Western societies, contemporary Chinese policy discourse places increasing emphasis on the integration of tradition with modernity. This theme has appeared repeatedly in official statements and speeches.

A humanoid robot conducts box-carrying training at a data collection pre-training center for humanoid robots in Hefei, east China's Anhui Province, Dec. 4, 2025. [Photo by Zhang Duan/Xinhua]

This orientation suggests a broader philosophical possibility — one that I would describe as a teleological state. The concept derives from Aristotle's notion of telos, or ultimate purpose. In classical philosophy, political communities were understood not merely as administrative mechanisms but as structures oriented toward a shared conception of the good life. The state existed, in Aristotle's formulation, "not only for the sake of living, but for living well."

Modern political systems have largely abandoned this teleological perspective. Liberal democracies tend to define the state primarily in procedural terms — protecting individual rights, ensuring the rule of law and facilitating economic exchange. While these functions are essential, they do not necessarily provide a coherent account of collective purpose.

A teleological state, by contrast, explicitly articulates a long-term civilizational objective. Such a system does not simply administer economic activity; it frames development within a broader narrative about human flourishing and civilizational direction.

As I see it, China's governance model already contains elements of this orientation. The country's political framework is structured around clearly defined developmental goals — most prominently the long-term objective of building a modern socialist country. Five-year plans function not only as economic management tools but also as instruments for aligning institutional action with these broader objectives.

Specifically, both the 2026 government work report delivered by Premier Li Qiang and the draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) have prioritized cultural-ethical progress, development of cultural undertakings, and enhancement of cultural confidence among the Chinese people. They form a comprehensive framework for achieving such goals as a marked rise in socialist civility, stronger cultural confidence, and a rich cultural life for the population.

China's experience therefore raises a question that extends beyond its own borders: can modern states rediscover a sense of collective purpose without sacrificing pluralism, innovation or individual dignity? As China succeeds in integrating rapid modernization with a clear civilizational telos, it may contribute not only to global economic development but also to a broader rethinking of political philosophy in the 21st century.

Bradley Blankenship is an investigative journalist, columnist, author, political analyst and the founding chairman of the Northern Kentucky Truth & Accountability Project, a local U.S. anti-corruption network and civic oversight body.

A central assumption of many 19th-century political philosophies was that liberation from oppressive social conditions would naturally lead individuals toward higher levels of rationality and moral awareness. Experience has shown that this assumption is overly optimistic. Human beings do not automatically develop greater psychological or moral maturity simply because external constraints are removed. Social behavior is strongly shaped by conditioning, habit and cultural context.

In the U.S., after World War II, these dynamics became particularly visible. American identity increasingly revolved around consumer participation in a rapidly expanding economy. Mass advertising and public relations transformed the cultural landscape, turning the human unconscious itself into a contested economic terrain. Meanwhile, many traditional sources of communal meaning — local civic institutions, religious life and shared cultural practices — gradually weakened.

The paradox was striking. Even as the U.S. experienced one of the most prosperous periods in human history, social alienation intensified. This phenomenon had already been anticipated by 19th-century critics such as Friedrich Nietzsche, who warned that modern societies would experience a crisis of meaning even amid material abundance.

These historical lessons raise an important question for China as it continues its own modernization process. Unlike many Western societies, contemporary Chinese policy discourse places increasing emphasis on the integration of tradition with modernity. This theme has appeared repeatedly in official statements and speeches.

A humanoid robot conducts box-carrying training at a data collection pre-training center for humanoid robots in Hefei, east China's Anhui Province, Dec. 4, 2025. [Photo by Zhang Duan/Xinhua]

This orientation suggests a broader philosophical possibility — one that I would describe as a teleological state. The concept derives from Aristotle's notion of telos, or ultimate purpose. In classical philosophy, political communities were understood not merely as administrative mechanisms but as structures oriented toward a shared conception of the good life. The state existed, in Aristotle's formulation, "not only for the sake of living, but for living well."

Modern political systems have largely abandoned this teleological perspective. Liberal democracies tend to define the state primarily in procedural terms — protecting individual rights, ensuring the rule of law and facilitating economic exchange. While these functions are essential, they do not necessarily provide a coherent account of collective purpose.

A teleological state, by contrast, explicitly articulates a long-term civilizational objective. Such a system does not simply administer economic activity; it frames development within a broader narrative about human flourishing and civilizational direction.

As I see it, China's governance model already contains elements of this orientation. The country's political framework is structured around clearly defined developmental goals — most prominently the long-term objective of building a modern socialist country. Five-year plans function not only as economic management tools but also as instruments for aligning institutional action with these broader objectives.

Specifically, both the 2026 government work report delivered by Premier Li Qiang and the draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) have prioritized cultural-ethical progress, development of cultural undertakings, and enhancement of cultural confidence among the Chinese people. They form a comprehensive framework for achieving such goals as a marked rise in socialist civility, stronger cultural confidence, and a rich cultural life for the population.

China's experience therefore raises a question that extends beyond its own borders: can modern states rediscover a sense of collective purpose without sacrificing pluralism, innovation or individual dignity? As China succeeds in integrating rapid modernization with a clear civilizational telos, it may contribute not only to global economic development but also to a broader rethinking of political philosophy in the 21st century.

Bradley Blankenship is an investigative journalist, columnist, author, political analyst and the founding chairman of the Northern Kentucky Truth & Accountability Project, a local U.S. anti-corruption network and civic oversight body.

The implications of these priorities extend well beyond China's borders. China's economic strategy is unfolding at a time when the international system is undergoing significant turbulence, marked by geopolitical rivalry, supply chain restructuring and growing skepticism toward globalization in parts of the West. Against this backdrop, Beijing has sought to position itself as a stabilizing force in the global economy.

Recent diplomatic engagements illustrate this strategy clearly. In meetings with Western leaders — including French President Emmanuel Macron, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz — Chinese leaders have emphasized China's role as a predictable partner in an increasingly uncertain world. At the same time, China has deepened engagement with developing economies, particularly in the Global South. Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently highlighted policies designed to expand economic cooperation with African countries, including zero-tariff treatment for imports from 53 African nations.

Taken together, these initiatives reflect a broader strategic orientation: China seeks to present itself as a platform for stability and development during what many analysts describe as a transitional phase in the international order.

But beyond the immediate economic and diplomatic dimensions of this strategy lies a deeper and less frequently discussed question — one that is sociological and philosophical in nature. How should a rapidly modernizing society maintain coherence and meaning as it transitions into a highly advanced technological and economic system?

In this respect, China's current stage of development invites comparison with the rise of the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The comparison is not exact. China's institutional structure, cultural context and geopolitical environment differ fundamentally from those of the U.S. a century ago. Nevertheless, from a sociological and psychological perspective, there are instructive parallels.

Aerial photo taken on Sept. 18, 2019 shows a night view of the Lujiazui area in Shanghai, east China. [Photo by Ren Long/Xinhua]

During the 19th century, the American intellectual tradition was strongly influenced by classical philosophy. Thinkers in the United States drew extensively on the Greco-Roman canon — Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Plutarch — emphasizing virtue, civic responsibility and the moral foundations of republican life. This classical orientation was evident in the writings of early American intellectuals and in the broader culture of civic republicanism that shaped the country's political institutions.

However, as the U.S. industrialized and urbanized, this intellectual orientation gradually shifted. By the late 19th century, American thought increasingly turned toward pragmatism, most prominently associated with Charles Sanders Peirce and William James. Pragmatism emphasized practical outcomes and empirical problem-solving rather than metaphysical or moral foundations.

This philosophical shift occurred in parallel with an unprecedented wave of technological and institutional innovation. The U.S. developed modern policing systems, emergency services, national railway networks and urban infrastructure on a massive scale. Electricity, telecommunication and modern sanitation transformed daily life. Industrial production was revolutionized through the introduction of assembly lines and large-scale manufacturing, while mass education expanded rapidly.

The result was the emergence of what might be called a managerial society — a system in which social life increasingly became organized through bureaucratic and technocratic structures. Human beings were progressively treated less as participants in a shared civic order and more as units within systems of administration, production and consumption.

This transformation did not go unnoticed. Karl Marx famously analyzed the phenomenon as a form of alienation inherent in industrial capitalism. Later, the social psychologist Erich Fromm offered a more detailed cultural critique in works such as "The Sane Society." Fromm argued that many modern social systems operate on anthropological assumptions that misunderstand the deeper needs of human beings.

A central assumption of many 19th-century political philosophies was that liberation from oppressive social conditions would naturally lead individuals toward higher levels of rationality and moral awareness. Experience has shown that this assumption is overly optimistic. Human beings do not automatically develop greater psychological or moral maturity simply because external constraints are removed. Social behavior is strongly shaped by conditioning, habit and cultural context.

In the U.S., after World War II, these dynamics became particularly visible. American identity increasingly revolved around consumer participation in a rapidly expanding economy. Mass advertising and public relations transformed the cultural landscape, turning the human unconscious itself into a contested economic terrain. Meanwhile, many traditional sources of communal meaning — local civic institutions, religious life and shared cultural practices — gradually weakened.

The paradox was striking. Even as the U.S. experienced one of the most prosperous periods in human history, social alienation intensified. This phenomenon had already been anticipated by 19th-century critics such as Friedrich Nietzsche, who warned that modern societies would experience a crisis of meaning even amid material abundance.

These historical lessons raise an important question for China as it continues its own modernization process. Unlike many Western societies, contemporary Chinese policy discourse places increasing emphasis on the integration of tradition with modernity. This theme has appeared repeatedly in official statements and speeches.

A humanoid robot conducts box-carrying training at a data collection pre-training center for humanoid robots in Hefei, east China's Anhui Province, Dec. 4, 2025. [Photo by Zhang Duan/Xinhua]

This orientation suggests a broader philosophical possibility — one that I would describe as a teleological state. The concept derives from Aristotle's notion of telos, or ultimate purpose. In classical philosophy, political communities were understood not merely as administrative mechanisms but as structures oriented toward a shared conception of the good life. The state existed, in Aristotle's formulation, "not only for the sake of living, but for living well."

Modern political systems have largely abandoned this teleological perspective. Liberal democracies tend to define the state primarily in procedural terms — protecting individual rights, ensuring the rule of law and facilitating economic exchange. While these functions are essential, they do not necessarily provide a coherent account of collective purpose.

A teleological state, by contrast, explicitly articulates a long-term civilizational objective. Such a system does not simply administer economic activity; it frames development within a broader narrative about human flourishing and civilizational direction.

As I see it, China's governance model already contains elements of this orientation. The country's political framework is structured around clearly defined developmental goals — most prominently the long-term objective of building a modern socialist country. Five-year plans function not only as economic management tools but also as instruments for aligning institutional action with these broader objectives.

Specifically, both the 2026 government work report delivered by Premier Li Qiang and the draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) have prioritized cultural-ethical progress, development of cultural undertakings, and enhancement of cultural confidence among the Chinese people. They form a comprehensive framework for achieving such goals as a marked rise in socialist civility, stronger cultural confidence, and a rich cultural life for the population.

China's experience therefore raises a question that extends beyond its own borders: can modern states rediscover a sense of collective purpose without sacrificing pluralism, innovation or individual dignity? As China succeeds in integrating rapid modernization with a clear civilizational telos, it may contribute not only to global economic development but also to a broader rethinking of political philosophy in the 21st century.

Bradley Blankenship is an investigative journalist, columnist, author, political analyst and the founding chairman of the Northern Kentucky Truth & Accountability Project, a local U.S. anti-corruption network and civic oversight body.